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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JASON McCLURE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) NO. 41571 
) 
) Elmore Co. Case No. 
) CR 1999-38 
) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) PETITION FOR REVIEW 
) 
) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state seeks review of the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. McClure, 
Docket No. 41571, 2014 Unpublished Op. No. 410 (Idaho App., March 13, 2015) 
(hereinafter "Slip Op."), which vacated the district court's order of contempt. A copy of 
the opinion is attached to this brief as "Appendix A." Specifically, the state seeks review 
of the Court of Appeals' holding that only affidavits which are notarized by public 
notaries constitute·verified affidavits. Slip Op. at 4-5. 
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Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 1999, the district court ordered McClure to pay $18,600.06 in fines and 
restitution, in connection with his conviction for two counts of burglary, to the victims of 
his crimes for damaged property and unrecovered stolen property. (R., pp.73-79, 84-
87.) As of January 2010, McClure still owed $13,881.56 in restitution. (R., p.198.) In 
2012, with the court's jurisdiction set to expire, the state filed a motion to clarify 
McClure's outstanding restitution obligations. (R., pp.171-73.) At a hearing on the 
state's motion, McClure agreed to make monthly payments of $50.00 until his fees were 
paid. (R., pp.218-19.) The district court ordered McClure to make the monthly 
payments of $50.00 and warned McClure that failure to do so could result in contempt 
proceedings. (R., pp.220-21.) The district court also entered a civil judgment, again 
ordering McClure to pay restitution. (R., pp.222-23.) 
Though he was able to, McClure failed to make even the de minimis payments of 
$50.00 a month. (R., p.270.) On June 27, 2012, Ms. Palmer, a deputy clerk of the 
district court with duties that included recording court orders and their satisfaction or 
default, swore out a Motion and Affidavit in Support of Contempt Proceedings before a 
second deputy clerk and declared that McClure had violated the court's order by failing 
to pay his restitution and was in contempt of court. (R., p.225.) A warrant issued (R., 
p.231) and, more than a year later, McClure was arrested (see R., p.228). 
McClure filed a motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings. (R., pp.236-39.) 
The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.254-56.) McClure entered a conditional 
guilty plea to the contempt, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
dismiss. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-13.) The district court held McClure in contempt. (R., pp.269-
2 
-
70.) McClure timely appealed (R., pp.260-63), arguing that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim of contempt because, he asserted, the 
contempt was not commenced by an affidavit (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11). 
The Court of Appeals agreed, determining that only affidavits which are notarized 
by a public notary constitute verified affidavits under Idaho law. Slip Op. at 4-5. The 
state filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUE 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has decided an issue that may have significant 
implications across Idaho law, in a way which is contrary to Idaho statutes and probably 
not in accordance with this Court's precedent. Is review of the Court of Appeals' 
decision therefore warranted? 
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ARGUMENT 
Review Of The Court Of Appeals' Decision Is Warranted Because It Has Decided An 
Issue, Which May Have Significant Implications Across Idaho Law, Contrary To Idaho 
Statutes And Probably Not In Accordance With This Court's Precedent 
A. Introduction 
Recognizing that "An affidavit is '[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down 
and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths," Slip op. 
at 4 (brackets original, citation omitted), the Court of Appeals' decision limits the officers 
"authorized to administer oaths," at least for affidavits, to only public notaries. This 
conclusion appears contrary to Idaho Code§ 9-1401, and was apparently reached by a 
misreading of the Idaho Supreme Court's precedent in Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 
537, 314 P.3d 587, 592 (2013). Review of the Court of Appeals' decision is warranted 
to correct and clarify the law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting of review is discretionary. I.AR. 118(b). "When considering a case on 
review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of 
the Court of Appeals, but reviews the district court's decision directly." State v. Corbus, 
150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of the law, including 
whether it confers subject matter jurisdiction, is a question over which the appellate 
court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 
(2004). 
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C. Review Of This Case Is Warranted To Provide A Clear Definition For The Term 
"Affidavit" Under Idaho Law 
While an affidavit must commence a contempt hearing, what constitutes a 
verified affidavit has far broader application in Idaho law than merely contempt hearings. 
A quick search of the Idaho Legislature's database reveals that the term "affidavit" is 
referenced 652 times in 371 sections of the Idaho Code. The Court of Appeals' opinion 
is unpublished in this case and cannot be cited as authority. However, the analysis it 
provides, especially how it interprets prior precedent by this Court to limit what 
constitutes a verified affidavit under Idaho law, may have broad ramifications. Having a 
clear, authoritative definition of what constitutes an affidavit will be useful in many 
contexts. Review of this issue is therefore warranted. 
D. The "Motion And Affidavit" Filed In This Case Constitutes A Verified Affidavit And 
So Conferred Subject Matter Jurisdiction Upon The District Court 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "affidavit" as "[a] voluntary declaration of facts 
written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer 
oaths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 66 (9th ed. 2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has cited 
this definition approvingly. Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 536, 314 P.3d 587, 591 
(2013). And it previously approved of a substantially similar definition. See Kelly v. 
State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
23 (3rd pocket ed. 2006), which defined "affidavit" as a "voluntary declaration of facts 
written down and sworn to by the declarant himself before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths, such as a notary public."). The Idaho Legislature has also adopted a 
substantially similar definition for "affidavit," at least as the term used in chapter 51 of 
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the Idaho Code, defining that term as "a declaration in writing, under oath, and sworn to 
or affirmed by the declarant before a person authorized to administer oaths." I.C. § 51-
102(5). 
Idaho Code § 9-1401 grants authority to those that may administer oaths under 
Idaho law and provides: 
Every court, every judge or clerk of any court, every justice and 
every notary public, the secretary of state, and every officer or person 
authorized to take testimony in any action or proceeding, or to decide 
upon evidence, has power to administer oaths or affirmations. 
Thus, like a public notary, a clerk of the court is an "officer authorized to administer 
oaths" under Idaho law. Id. Any law conferring power or imposing duties on a principal 
officer in the State of Idaho also includes that officer's deputies. I.C. § 31-2008. 
Therefore, deputy clerks of the court are also "officer[s] authorized to administer oaths." 
Because the Motion and Affidavit in Support of Contempt Proceedings (R., p.225) was a 
"voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by" D. Palmer (a deputy clerk 
of the court and the declarant), before a second deputy clerk of the court ("an officer 
authorized to administer oaths"), it constitutes an affidavit. 
The Court of Appeals held that the contempt was not commenced by an affidavit 
as required by Idaho Criminal Rule 42(c) because the affidavit was not sworn to before 
a public "notary, wherein the notary provides a jurat." Slip Op. at 4-5. But Rule 42(c) 
does not require the affidavit to be sworn to before a public notary. Relevant to this 
case, Rule 42(c) requires: 
All contempt proceedings ... must be commenced by a motion and 
affidavit. The affidavit must allege the specific facts constituting the 
alleged contempt. Each instance of alleged contempt, if there is more 
than one, must be set forth separately. If the alleged contempt is the 
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violation of a court order, the affidavit must allege that either the 
respondent or the respondent's attorney was served with a copy of the 
order or had actual knowledge of it. The affidavit need not allege facts 
showing that the respondent's failure to comply with the court order was 
willful. 
Rule 42(c) only requires an affidavit; it does not limit itself to only affidavits which are 
sworn to before notaries public. 
If an affidavit is a "voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the 
declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths"-as defined by Black's Legal 
Dictionary and cited to approvingly by this Court, and as defined by the Idaho Code-
and a deputy clerk of the court is "an officer authorized to administer oaths," as 
unambiguously set forth in the Idaho Code, then the "motion and affidavit" in this case is 
an affidavit. As an affidavit, it was sufficient to confer subject matter on the district court 
and commence contempt proceedings against McClure. See Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 
Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 877, 881 (2007) (citation omitted). 
Granting review will allow this Court to clarify its prior precedent and provide an 
authoritative definition of what constitutes an "affidavit" under Idaho law. In recognition 
of that term's broad usage, resolution of this issue may have broad implications. 
Review of this case is therefore warranted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to please grant review of the Court of 
Appeals' decision and, ultimately, affirm the district court's order. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 2015. 
. Q/~~(PL_ 
~
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of April, 2015, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
¼~ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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APPENDIX A 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 41571 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 410 
Filed: March 13, 2015 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
JASON R. McCLURE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Elmore County. Hon. Michael Wetherell, District Judge. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, 
District Judge. 
Judgment of conviction and sanction for contempt, vacated and case remanded. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jason C. Pintler argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Russell J. Spencer argued. 
GRATTON, Judge 
Jason R. McClure appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction entered upon a 
conditional guilty plea to criminal contempt. We vacate the district court's judgment. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1999, McClure pled guilty to two counts of burglary, Idaho Code § 18-1401. The 
district court sentenced McClure to a unified term of ten years with two years determinate and 
retained jurisdiction. The district court also ordered McClure to pay $18,600.06 in restitution to 
the victims for damaged property and unrecovered stolen property, as well as costs and fees. At 
the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentence and placed 
McClure on probation. Subsequently, McClure admitted to violating his probation and the 
district court revoked his probation, but again retained jurisdiction. At the close of the second 
period ofretainedjurisdiction, the court reinstated McClure's probation. 
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In 2010, prior to the expiration of McClure's probation, the State filed a motion to clarify 
McClure's restitution obligation. Following a hearing on the motion, conducted after McClure's 
probation had terminated, the court entered an order stating that "all fines, fees, restitution and 
other costs that have not yet been paid in this matter are reordered for a total of $14,452.56," 
including $13,881.56 in restitution. The order required McClure to make monthly payments of 
fifty dollars, and warned that the failure to do so could result in contempt proceedings against 
him which could result in a $5,000 fine and/or five days in jail. The court also entered a 
corresponding civil judgment for the remaining restitution balance, but stayed the execution of 
the judgment so long as McClure made minimum payments of fifty dollars per month. 
Approximately two years later, an Elmore County deputy district court clerk filed a 
"Motion and Affidavit in Support of Contempt Proceedings," declaring that McClure had 
violated the court's order by failing to pay restitution. 1 An arrest warrant for contempt was 
issued and over one year later McClure was arrested. McClure filed a motion to dismiss the 
contempt proceeding against him, which was denied. McClure conditionally pled guilty to the 
contempt allegation, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss, and he 
was sentenced to five days in jail with credit for time served. McClure timely appeals. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
McClure challenges, for the first time on appeal, the sufficiency of the motion and 
affidavit which alleged he was in contempt of the restitution order. Specifically, he contends that 
the contempt proceeding was not properly commenced because the affidavit was not sworn to 
before a notary public, and thus it did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district 
court, rendering the judgment void. On the other hand, the State advances several arguments as 
Although not directly raised as issues in this appeal, the Court has several concerns 
regarding this matter: First, we question the district court's authority to enter the 2010 order on 
the motion to clarify, particularly since probation had expired by the time the order was entered. 
Second, even if the 2010 order was effective, the motion and purported affidavit do not reference 
or appear to relate to the 2010 order clarifying McClure's restitution obligation. Rather, the 
purported affidavit references the original judgment entered in 1999 that ordered McClure to pay 
$18,600.06 in restitution; yet, without explanation of how the amount is arrived at, the document 
identifies his remaining restitution obligation as $13,184.56. Third, in light of the above, we 
further question the propriety of the contempt proceeding seeking criminal sanctions when a civil 
judgment had been entered. However, because of our disposition with this matter, we need not 
address these issues. 
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to why the document is sufficient as an affidavit: First, the affidavit should be liberally 
construed to impart jurisdiction, citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 758-59, 101 P.3d 699, 702-
03 (2004). 2 Second, a deputy clerk is an officer authorized to administer oaths pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-1401, and therefore, a notary was not required. Third, McClure's challenge to the 
document is actually a challenge to the form of the document, which must be disregarded unless 
it prejudices him. Fourth, since the alleged defect is imminently correctable, the objection 
should have been raised before trial. 
In Idaho, contempt can be characterized as either direct ( committed in the presence of the 
court) or indirect (committed outside the presence of the court). Jones v. Jones, 91 Idaho 578, 
428 P.2d 497 (1967). Where the alleged contempt is not committed in the immediate view and 
presence of the court and is a violation of a court order, the contempt proceeding must be 
commenced by a motion and affidavit. Idaho Code § 7-603; Idaho Criminal Rule 42(c). The 
affidavit on which contempt proceedings are based constitutes the complaint and until the 
claimant can provide a sufficient affidavit, the court does not have jurisdiction to proceed. 
Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 243, 159 P.3d 877, 881 (2007). Since contempt proceedings 
are quasi-criminal in nature, "no intendments or presumptions may be indulged to aid the 
sufficiency of the affidavit." Jones, 91 Idaho at 581, 428 P.2d at 500. To the extent the 
purported affidavit here is insufficient, it is jurisdictional and can be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 3 State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163, 244 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2010). Whether a 
charging document conforms to the requirements of the law, including whether it confers subject 
matter jurisdiction, is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Jones, 140 
Idaho at 757, 101 P.3d at 701. 
2 In Jones, the Court held that the charging document's failure to allege an essential 
element of the crime for which the defendant was being charged was cured by a liberal 
construction of the information and reading the applicable code section into the text of the 
charge. However, Jones is inapposite because, unlike the enumerated code provision which 
cured the defect in the charging document, here there is no equivalent to supply the required 
components of an affidavit to cure a jurisdictional deficiency. Thus, the State's first argument is 
without merit. 
3 Thus, the State's third argument regarding a challenge to form, and fourth argument 
regarding raising the issue before trial are without merit and will not further be addressed. 
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As noted, LC.R. 42(c) requires contempt proceedings to be initiated by a motion and 
affidavit. An affidavit is "[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the 
declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 66 (9th 
ed. 2009). It is undisputed that the purported affidavit initiating contempt proceedings against 
McClure was not sworn to before a notary public and did not include a notary stamp, but rather, 
it was sworn to by a deputy clerk before a second deputy clerk. However, the State argues 
that like a notary public, a deputy clerk is an officer authorized to administer oaths pursuant to 
LC. § 9-1401, 4 and thus the affidavit was properly verified, without a notarization compliant 
with LC.§ 51-109(2). We need not decide the scope of what LC.§ 9-1401 authorizes as we look 
to the text of LC.R. 42(c) and what it requires to commence contempt proceedings: a motion and 
affidavit. 
Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court in Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 537, 314 P.3d 
587, 592 (2013), described an affidavit as subscribed and sworn to before a notary, wherein the 
notary provides a jurat in accordance with LC. § 51-109(2). 5 ("The declaration plainly is not an 
affidavit because it lacks notarization."); see also Houston v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 902, 216 
P.3d 1272, 1274 (2009) ("The declaration lacked a jurat, which is necessary in order for it to 
constitute an affidavit."); Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210,218 n.9, 796 P.2d 87, 95 n.9 
(1990) ("The 'affidavit' filed by Mr. Evans, while in partial affidavit form, is not subscribed and 
sworn to as an oath or affirmation, as required of an affidavit."). Idaho Criminal Rule 42(c) 
requires an affidavit in order to commence a contempt proceeding and impart jurisdiction on the 
4 Idaho Code § 9-1401 provides: "Every court, every judge or clerk of any court, every: 
justice and every notary public, the secretary of state, and every officer or person authorized to 
take testimony in any action or proceeding, or to decide upon evidence, has power to administer 
oaths or affirmations." 
5 Idaho Code § 51-109(2) provides: "An oath or affirmation, which is in writing, shall be 
signed by the person who takes it, and the notary public shall enter thereunder substantially the 
following: 
'State of Idaho ) 
) ss 
County of.... ) 
Subscribed and sworn ( or affirmed) before me this ..... day of ...... , ..... 
.. .. .... (official signature and seal)'" 
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court. Consistent with the above-cited cases, the affidavit contemplated by I.C.R. 42(c) must be 
notarized. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the purported affidavit lacks notarization, the contempt proceeding was not 
properly commenced, and thus it did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district court. 
The district court's judgment holding McClure in criminal contempt is vacated and this case 
remanded to the district court. 
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR. 
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